We consider the consensus problem in a partially synchronous system with Byzantine faults. In a distributed system of n processes, where each process has an initial value, Byzantine consensus is the problem of agreeing on a common value, even though some of the processes may fail in arbitrary, even malicious, ways. It is shown in [11] that -in a synchronous system -3t + 1 processes are needed to solve the Byzantine consensus problem without signatures, where t is the maximum number of Byzantine processes. In an asynchronous system, Fischer, Lynch and Peterson [7] proved that no deterministic asynchronous consensus protocol can tolerate even a single non-Byzantine (= crash) failure. The problem can however be solved using randomization for benign and Byzantine faults. For Byzantine faults, Ben-Or [2] and Rabin [12] showed that this requires 5t + 1 processes. Later, Bracha [3] increased the resiliency of the randomized algorithm to 3t + 1.
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In 1988, Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer [6] , considered an asynchronous system that eventually becomes synchronous (called partially synchronous system). The consensus algorithms proposed in [6] , ensure safety in all executions, while guaranteeing liveness only if there exists a period of synchrony. Recently, several papers have considered the partially synchronous system model for Byzantine consensus [4, 10, 8, 1, 5] . However, [1, 5] point out a potential weakness of these Byzantine consensus algorithms, namely that they suffer from "performance failure". According to [1] , a performance failure occurs when messages are sent slowly by a Byzantine leader, but without triggering protocol timeouts, and the paper points out that the PBFT leader-based algorithm [4] is vulnerable to such an attack. Interestingly, all deterministic Byzantine consensus algorithms for non-synchronous systems are leader-based. This raises the following fundamental question: is it possible to design a deterministic Byzantine consensus algorithm for a partially synchronous system that is not leader-based? With such an algorithm, performance failure of Byzantine processes might be harmless.
Results.
Our results confirm the existence of a deterministic leader-free Byzantine consensus algorithm in a partially synchronous system that is resilientoptimal and signature-free. We started from the observation that leader-free consensus algorithms exist for the synchronous system, both for benign faults (e.g., the FloodSet algorithm [9] ) and for Byzantine faults (e.g., the algorithm based on interactive consistency [11] ). However, these algorithms violate agreement if executed during the asynchronous period of a partially synchronous system. Therefore we tried to combine one of these algorithms with a second algorithm that ensures agreement in an asynchronous system.
We have applied our methodology by combining the synchronous consensus algorithm of [11] with a new algorithm that employs mechanisms from several consensus algorithms, e.g., Ben-Or [2] , and PBFT [4] with strong validity. Let us denote these two algorithms by A 1 , respt. A 2 . Our combined algorithm is expressed in a round model. In each round, a correct process sends a message to all, receives a subset of messages sent, and computes its new state based on the messages received. Algorithm A 1 ensures that at the end of t + 1 rounds, (i) if q is a correct process, any correct process p receives either v q from q or nothing, where v q is the value initially sent by process q, and (ii) if q is a faulty process, any correct process p receives either some common value v from q or nothing. Moreover, if all t + 1 rounds are executed in synchronous periods, then all correct processes have the same set of messages at the end of t + 1 rounds. Algorithm A 2 ensures safety (i.e., agreement and strong validity), while algorithm A 1 provides liveness (i.e., termination) during periods of synchrony. Our leader-free Byzantine consensus algorithm requires 3t + 1 processes, and t + 3 rounds per consensus instance during periods of synchrony.
